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Towards a Recognition and Dialogue
Secularism in Europe 1
Jean-Paul Willaime*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Europe, there are various forms of secular recognition of
religions, which combine mutual independence of the state and
religion (secularism) and an explicit consideration of the place and
role of religions within society (recognition). Exploring the features
of religion-state relations in several European countries will allow us
to both better identify each country’s own logic and avoid the risk of
analysing them through the prism of French secularism. In doing so,
the latter, recognition, will probably appear in its singularity since
European schemes combine both orientations, “secularism” and
“recognition,” which, from the French point of view, appear not to
be easily compatible.
Though Europe has a history of violence associated with religion
or its negation, 2 it also has a history of the pacification of religious
and anti-religious violence. 3 In other words, there is a history of the
emergence of democratic societies who respected freedom of
conscience and thought and who gradually built religious pluralism.
This historical construction of peace and civil tolerance allows
countries to organize themselves as political communities while
recognizing that the plurality of religious and philosophical choices
* Director of Studies at the Practical School of Higher Studies [Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes],
Sorbonne,
Paris,
Group
Societies,
Religions,
Secularisms;
jeanpaul.willaime@gsrl.cnrs.fr.
1. A French version of this paper is published as follows: Jean-Paul Willaime, La
prédominance européenne d’une laïcité de reconnaissance des religions, RECONFIGURATIONS ET
NOUVEAUX DÉFIS 101–22 (Jean Baubérot, Micheline Milot, & Philippe Portier eds., Paris,
Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2014). We thank the Publishing House of
Human Sciences [Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme] for authorizing this
publication in English.
2. See generally, Caroline Ford, Violence and the Sacred in Nineteenth-Century France,
21 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUD. 101 (1998) (which discusses the sixteenth-century religious
wars and their effect on France and Europe).
3. See generally, Mario Turchetti, Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in
Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France, 22 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 15 (1991).
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of their people was neither built in a day nor without conflict. In
several European countries, this historic process is not very old: for
example, the democratic transitions of the former communist bloc
countries, or Spain and Portugal. 4 Autonomy of politics and law
from religion was an essential element of these developments. 5 For
each country, the philosophical, political, and religious genealogy of
this process can be established. For some, this evolution was
essentially made against religion in general or against a particular
religion; others emphasized the contributions of the religions
themselves to these changes. 6 Be that as it may, thanks to the
secularization of politics, religious renunciation of political power
and political renunciation of spiritual power became essential features
of democracy in Europe. 7 Because political power has learned to
renounce spiritual power and religious power has learned (and
continues to learn every day) to give way to temporal power, a
recognition of and dialogue about secularism in Europe is possible
today. This new sharing of power creates tension and conflict that is
not only normal, but essential. Indeed, an absence of tension and
conflict would cause an imbalance in favour of either a religious view
or, conversely, a secularist view of man and the world. It is a hallmark
of democracies to leave these differences to express themselves. 8
The institutionalization and practices of various forms of secular
recognition do not eliminate any conflicting dynamic either between
the various religious and philosophical convictions, or between
religious normativity and secular normativity. 9 Many national
identities in Europe have been and remain marked by religious
dimensions; this is particularly clear in countries where a large
majority of the population identifies with a religious tradition that is
related to the affirmation of national sentiment (e.g. the Orthodox

4. See generally PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., 1993).
5. See, e.g., Javier Martinez-Torron, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in
Spain, 2006 BYU L. REV. 777, 784 (2006).
6. Id. at 783.
7. RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 64 (Gabriel Motzkin &
Yochi Fischer eds., 2008).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
9. For example, see RELIGIOUS AND GENDER NORMS: CHANGES, RESISTANCE, AND
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RECONFIGURATIONS [NORMES RELIGIEUSES ET GENRE:
MUTATIONS, RÉSISTANCES ET RECONFIGURATIONS XIXE-XXIE SIÈCLE] (Florence Rochefort
& Maria Eleonora Sanna eds., 2013) for issues relating to gender.
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Greece, the Lutheran Denmark, and the Catholic Ireland). 10 Even if,
in each national society, there is a real religious and philosophical
pluralisation of people and acceptance of the convictional options at
the individual level, the national and European levels themselves are
less secularized than we might think. This lack of secularization was
recently demonstrated in the Swiss vote on minarets in 2009 11 as well
as the Lautsi case concerning the presence of crucifixes in classrooms
in Italy in 2011. 12
The state-religion relations, as they were historically constructed
in each country, have become significant elements of each state’s
national identity. The way the states related to their gods, or rather
those who claim to represent them, became an essential part of their
political identity. 13 Of course we think of France as a prototypical
secularist country, 14 but we also think of the United Kingdom and its
two established churches (the Anglican Church in England and the
Presbyterian Church in Scotland), 15 Germany with its separation of
church and state that incorporates partnering relationships between
churches and public authorities, 16 and Poland with its exodus from
the communist bloc. 17 The political and religious stories of every
European country, and the very ways each of these stories has
interfered in the processes of state-building and nation-building, are
national peculiarities that establish the various forms of religion-state
10. Predominant
Religions,
ADHERENTS.COM,
http://www.adherents.com/
adh_predom.html (last visited July 30, 2015).
11. See Nick Cumming-Bruce & Steven Erlanger, Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on
TIMES,
Nov.
29,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
Mosques,
N.Y.
11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html?_r=0.
12. Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, App. No. 30814/06 (2011); see also
Grégor Puppinck, The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis, 2012 BYU L. REV. 873, 875 (2012).
13. Rogers Brubaker, Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM 2, 6 (2012); see generally Zachary D. Smith, Commandments, Crosses, &
Prayers: The Roberts Court’s Approach to Public Religion, 2015 BYU L. REV. 845, 846 (arguing
that the current U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to public religion helps build a
national identity).
14. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) [hereinafter FRENCH CONSTITUTION].
15. Foster Parent Ban: ‘This is a Secular State’, say High Court Judges, THE TELEGRAPH,
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8353527/Foster-parent-banthis-is-a-secular-state-say-High-Court-judges.html.
16. Religious Freedom in Germany, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE AND
WORLD AFFAIRS, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/religious-freedom-in-germany
(last visited Aug. 3, 2015).
17. Karol H. Borowski, The Sociology of Religion in Modern Poland: A Critical Review,
46 SOC. ANALYSIS 389, 391 (1985).
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relationships. This is particularly true in countries where national
identity is closely linked to a religion, and in the formally
denominational states. This is the case in Greece—whose
Constitution of 1975 was enacted “in the name of the Holy and
Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity”; 18 Bulgaria—whose Eastern
Orthodox Religion is recognized as the “traditional religion of the
Republic”; 19 Denmark—where, according to the Constitution of
1953, “[t]he Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established
Church of Denmark, and as such shall be supported by the State,”
and where “the King shall be a member of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church”; 20 and Malta—whose Constitution of 1964 states that
“[t]he religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion”
and that “the authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and
which are wrong.” 21
II. “LAÏCITÉ”: A MATTER MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE WORD
This Part starts by addressing the different approaches between
Catholic and Protestant countries as seen in the term Laïcité. It then
describes how both these religious separationist and partnership
countries have started to move closer to one another in a regime of
separation-recognition. Finally, it finishes by discussing the two
different types of secularism, the implications of those differences,
and the ability of any country to adopt the more religiously accepted
version of secularism.
Laïcité, as a movement for emancipation of public institutions
and people from any religious influence, appears to be a more
operative concept in Catholic countries than in countries marked by
Protestantism. 22 This is not surprising since the term “laïcité” itself is
found more often in Latin languages (i.e. Catholic countries) than in
Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Scandinavian languages (i.e. Protestant,
Orthodox, or bi-denominational countries). “Laïcité” appears as an
emancipation movement in comparison to the former influence of
the Catholic Church in and on some national societies. Comparing
18. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] (Greece) (amended 2001).
19. 1991 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, art. 14.
20. 1953 CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF DENMARK, §§ 4, 6.
21. 1964 CONSTITUTION OF MALTA, art. 2, §§ 1−2.
22. David A. Martin, Religion and Public Values: A Catholic-Protestant Contrast, 26
REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 313, 327 (1985).
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France and Germany, the philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry noted that
“the secularization of French society is not the secularization of
German society. These are two different ways of political
neutralization of religions: the Catholic or post-Catholic way is
carried out in the mode of separation, while the Protestant way
proceeds by internalizing or absorbing originally religious
elements.” 23 The Enlightenment was modulated differently in
different countries and has not maintained the same relationship to
religious matter. 24 While aiming at the emancipation of individuals
and the achievement of a just society, the emphasis, specifies JeanMarc Ferry, has not been placed on the same levers of
development. 25 “In practice, the French Enlightenment would rather
emphasize the importance of the state and politics; the Scottish
Enlightenment, the market and civil society; the Prussian
Enlightenment, the University and culture.” 26 In other words, all
European countries did not enter political agnosticism in the same
way or for the same reasons. 27
After opposing both the denominational model that prevailed in
countries with a protestant and orthodox culture and the separation
models that prevailed in predominantly Catholic countries of
Europe, Philippe Portier described a crossover movement:
“Denominational states have opened to the separatist logic, separatist
states to the partnership logic. Hence, we have seen a shared model
of secularism emerge in Europe, which meets the criteria of both
equality and recognition of memberships, specific to the regime of
flexible separation.” 28 Indeed, a regime of separation-recognition
prevails in Europe, a regime which, while based on the respective
autonomy of the state and religions, explicitly recognizes the place
and role of religious groups by giving them a specific
legal framework. 29
23. Jean-Marc Ferry, Les Lumières: un projet contemporain? [The Enlightenment: a
contemporary project?], ESPRIT [SPIRIT], Aug.–Sept. 2009, at 164 (Fr.).
24. Id. at 163–64.
25. Id. at 164.
26. Id.
27. Philippe Portier, États et Églises en Europe: Vers un modèle commun de laïcité? [States
and Churches in Europe: Towards a common model of secularism], 393 FUTURIBLES 89,
91 (2013).
28. Id. at 98.
29. James Q. Whitman, Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide, 34 HIST.
REFLECTIONS 86, 95 (2008).
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However, before showing how this separation-recognition is
expressed in the various European countries, it is necessary to clarify
what is meant by secularism. There are two dimensions of secularism:
1) a general principle for state-religion relationships in pluralist
democracies that respect the freedom of conscience, thought, and
religion and all that is implied by such freedom (secularity); and 2) a
philosophical, free-thinking, and agnostic concept that promotes a
secular vision of man and the world as an alternative to religious
concepts (secularism). 30 How states define secularism impacts their
acceptance of the term as applied to their own national identity. In
Belgium, for example, secularism is recognized as the concept of
being free-thinking, comparable to various religions. 31 The
sociologist Jean Rémy was keen on emphasizing that the Belgian
State is pluralistic and non-secular. 32 In some respects, however,
Belgium is more secular than France, which sometimes allows itself
to be penetrated more by a philosophical secularism as a criticism of
religion than by a genuine secular neutrality. 33 As emphasized in the
Strasbourg Consortium, the distinction between secularity and
secularism is fundamental:
There is an important, perhaps critical, distinction between
secularity and secularism: One concept is a fundamental component
of liberal pluralism and a bastion against religious extremism, and
the other is a misguided, even dangerous, ideology that may
degenerate into its own dystopian fundamentalism. Secularity is an
approach to religion-state relations that avoids identification of the
state with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism
itself) and that endeavors to provide a neutral framework capable of

30. José Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 4 SOC. RESEARCH 1049, 1050–51
(2009); see also Iain McLean, Secularity and Secularism in the United Kingdom: On the Way to
the First Amendment, 2011 BYU L. REV. 637 (2011).
31. Jean-Paul Willaime, Les laïcités belge et française au défi de la laïcité européenne
[Belgian and French Secularisms Challenge European Secularism], in POLITIQUE ET RELIGION
EN FRANCE ET EN BELGIQUE [POLITICS AND RELIGION IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM] 161–77
(François Foret ed., 2009); see also Jean-Paul Willaime, Religious and Philosophical Diversity as
a Challenge for the Secularism: A Belgian-French Comparison, in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM:
FRAMING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 63–72 (Giuseppe Giordan
& Enzo Pace eds., 2014).
32. Christian Maroy, Jean Remy & Luc Van Campenhoudt, Faith and the Craft:
Symbolic Transactions in Christian Institutions [La Foi et Le Métier: Transactions Symboliques
Dans Les Institutions Chrétiennes], 100 INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY PAPERS [100 CAHIERS
INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE] 91, 92 (1996).
33. Id.
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accommodating a broad range of religions and beliefs. Secularism,
in contrast, is an ideological position that is committed to
promoting a secular order. 34

In other words, secularism is not the secularist state. The secular
state, in democratic societies, is a neutral and impartial state
regarding the religions and beliefs of its nationals; in other words, a
state which, when functioning as a state, does professes neither a
particular religion nor any atheistic philosophy of life. This secular
state, which also involves the secular character of public institutions
and services (and their agents), does not mean that the society itself
is secular. The people who comprise the populous may have very
diversified religious affiliations or none at all, and the states may
consider this component of civil societies by integrating their
contributions to public life. Whether the word “secularism” is
employed or not, this principled secularism (corresponding to
English “secularity” and the notion of the secular state) is based on
the following three elements:
1) Freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, which
includes the freedom to have or to not have a religion,
the freedom to change religion, and the freedom to
practice or to not practice the religion of one’s choice
(within the limits of law, democracy, and human rights);
2) Equality of rights and duties of all citizens regardless of
their religious or philosophical identifications, i.e., nondiscrimination of persons by the State and public
authorities
based
on
their
religious
or
philosophical affiliations;
3) The respective autonomy of the State and religions, which
means both the freedom of the State in relation to
religions and the freedom of religions in relation to the
State (while complying with the laws and principles of
human rights within a democracy). 35

34. Secularism
vs.
Secularity
in
Europe,
STRASBOURG
CONSORTIUM,
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/?blurbId=379&table=blurb_fa&pageId=9 (last visited
June 15, 2015); see also Neville Rochow, An Incurable Malaise: Commonwealth v. Australian
Capital Territory and Baskin v. Bogan as Symptoms of Early-Onset Dystopia, 2015 BYU L. REV.
609 (2015).
35. Id.
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In Europe, compliance with this principled secularism does not
appear incompatible with various forms of recognition of religions. 36
This is why support for the idea of “secularism of recognition,” even
if this expression may mirror church-state separation in France,
resonates strangely in French secular ears. Indeed, in France,
interference was very prevalent between secularism as a principle of
regulating pluralism by a neutral state and as a critical view of
religion. In fact, the tradition of an emancipatory state exercising a
sort of philosophical magisterium on the population weighed in
relation with the religious was often more prevalent, as the “true”
freedom was only to be found in the emancipation against
religions. 37 Thus, as soon as public recognition is manifest with
regard to a religious matter, it quickly gives rise to reactions from
those who confuse secularism and privatization of religious matters.
Despite the weight of this tradition and its reactionary response to
Islam, developments have nevertheless taken place. 38 Philippe
Portier, in a contribution in which he distinguishes different variants
of “recognition plans” (“restricted,” “positive,” and “negative”), 39
observes that, had France started from a negative recognition
regime, it would have evolved towards a recognition and dialogue
secularism. 40 Having developed this thesis in 2005 myself, 41 I note
today that the trend predicted then is confirmed now, especially in

36. Whitman, supra note 29.
37. Jean-Paul Willaime, The Paradoxes of Laïcité in France, in THE CENTRALITY OF
RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES A. BECKFORD 41–54 (Eileen Barker
ed., 2008).
38. Id. at 47–49.
39. Philippe Portier, Introduction : The religious essence of political modernity. Elements
for a renewal of secularism theory [Introduction: L’essence religieuse de la modernité politique.
Éléments pour un renouvellement de la théorie de la laïcité], in MODERNITY AGAINST
RELIGION? A NEW APPROACH TO SECULARISM [LA MODERNITÉ CONTRE LA RELIGION? POUR
UNE NOUVELLE APPROCHE DE LA LAÏCITÉ] 7, 17 (Jacqueline Lagrée & Philippe Portier
eds., 2010).
40. Philippe Portier, Conclusion: “Plural Modernities?” A longitudinal approach to
national regulatory models of belief in Western democracies [Conclusion: “Modernités plurielles?”
Une approche longitudinale des modèles nationaux de régulation du croire dans les démocraties
occidentales], in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP [PLURALISME RELIGIEUX ET
CITOYENNETÉ] 255–56 (Micheline Milot, Philippe Portier & Jean-Paul Willaime eds., 2010).
41. See Jean-Paul Willaime, 1905 et la pratique d’une laïcité de reconnaissance sociale des
religions [1905 and the Practice of a Secularism of Social Recognition of Religions], 129
ARCHIVES DE SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS [ARCHIVES OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF
RELIGIONS] 67 (2005).
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certain areas of public action, 42 even if there are some secularist
tensions facing Islam. 43 The next Part will develop this idea of
“recognition secularism” and then demonstrate its prevalence
throughout many major Western and Eastern European countries.
III. THE EUROPEAN PREVALENCE OF A RECOGNITION
SECULARISM
Focusing on Europe allows specificity and refinement of the
concept of recognition secularism by 1) providing additional
elements of empirical validation and 2) showing how this is a suitable
phrase to describe the reality of religion-state relations as can be
observed in most European countries (although, as mentioned
previously, 44 a few countries are still denominational states). As used
in this Paper, the term recognition secularism refers to the social
recognition of religious communities. This recognition is certainly
reflected in legal terms by specific legal frameworks available to
religious groups, but it is the aspect of social recognition that I would
especially like to emphasize. Legal recognition is only the translation,
at the legal level, of a socio-cultural consideration of religions and
their contributions to community life. There is a social recognition
of religions as specific social and cultural realities—associative
groups. Particular associative groups generate specific modes of
consideration, including within the legal framework extant in each
country. States recognize religions across five dimensions:
1) a strictly legal dimension when providing specific legal
frameworks to carry out religious activities; 45

42. This is especially true in the prison and military chaplaincies. With regard to the
first, the research carried out by Celine Beraud, Claire de Galembert and Corinne Rostaing
discusses the consideration of the social utility of religion inside the prison environment in
terms of “the religion that appeases.” Religious connections offer opportunities for a spiritual
escape from the rigors of confinement. Céline Béraud, De Galembert Claire & Corinne
Rostaing, GODS AND MEN IN PRISON [DES HOMMES ET DES DIEUX EN PRISON] (2013). The
authors characterize the prison secularism as recognition secularity. Id. at 34.
43. Id. at 166.
44. See supra text accompanying note 18–21.
45. Jean-Paul Williame, La sécularisation: Une exception européenne? Retour sur un
concept et sa discussion en sociologie des religions [Secularization: A European Exception?
Returning to a concept and its discussion in sociology of religions], 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE
SOCIOLOGIE [FRENCH REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY] 755, 761 (2006). In France, this is true even
for religious associations and congregations.
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2) a strictly social dimension when taking into account religious
contributions in the areas of social solidarity and education; 46
3) an ethical dimension when consulting on issues involving
conceptions of the human person; 47
4) a more political dimension when States provide for partnership
and cooperation with religious groups to work towards
common goals; 48 and

5) a more symbolic dimension when States mobilize religions, often

the majority religion, to celebrate the national communion on
particular occasions (e.g., deaths, disasters, etc.). 49

Consider how that recognition has taken shape in several countries,
including those that have recently adopted new state-religion
relationships either by abolishing a non-separation scheme, 50 or, for
the countries of the former communist bloc, creating a new scheme
within the construction of a democratic system. 51 The fact that these
various forms of recognition secularism are recent creations in several
countries shows that it is not a scenario resulting from potentially
obsolete historical and traditional legacies. No, these recently
established religion-state relationships are considered appropriate
arrangements for relations with religions in democratic societies that
respect human rights. 52
Before analyzing four countries of the former communist bloc,
let us examine seven countries in Western Europe and their
relationship with religion: three predominantly Lutheran Protestant
(Sweden, Norway, and Germany) and four predominately Catholic
(Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and Austria).
Sweden and Norway 53 chose a separation-recognition scheme, far
from a separation “the French way.” 54 In Sweden, after having
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 2009.
51. Borowski, supra note 17, at 391.
52. The information reported on each country is taken from the records of the Eurel
website (sociological and legal data on religion in Europe) and is available at the following
address: www.eurel.info. We also used the Spain leaflet in the Observatory Pharos data bank on
pluralism of cultures and religions: http://www.observatoirepharos.com/.
53. Norway recently introduced a state-religion separation, Church of Norway – A Brief
History, CHURCH OF NORWAY (Feb. 16, 2015), https://kirken.no/nb-NO/church-of-
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introduced a separation between the Lutheran Church and the State
in 2000, 55 religious communities can register and have the
acknowledged right to use the state tax system to collect
membership fees. 56 State aid is provided for religious communities
who “contribute to maintaining and strengthening the fundamental
values upon which society is based” and demonstrate stability. 57 In
Norway, on May 21, 2012, the Parliament almost unanimously
approved a Constitutional amendment that made the Norwegian
Lutheran Church more independent. 58 It is remarkable to observe
two facts which show that here, too, the separation is far from
“French”: 1) the Norwegian Constitution stressed the fact that the
country’s “values will remain [their] Christian and humanist
heritage”; 59 2) the Norwegian Lutheran Church, to which the royal
family will have to continue to belong, 60 was in favour of
separation. 61 The Church will continue to collect public funds along
with other religious groups. 62
On the other hand, Portugal and Spain, two countries of the
Iberian Peninsula, redesigned their religion-state relationship
following the end of dictatorial regimes and the consecutive building
of their democracies. 63 The Portuguese law on religious freedom
from June 22, 2001 explicitly defines two principles: separation and
cooperation. 64 The Portuguese government must work with the
churches and religious communities rooted in Portugal, given their
representativeness, in particular to promote human rights, contribute
norway/about/brief-history/; Swedes End Long Union of Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec.
31,
1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/world/swedes-end-long-union-ofchurch-and-state.html.
54. FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14.
55. Carol J. Williams, Sweden Ends Designation of Lutheranism as Official Religion, L.A.
TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/jan/01/ local/me-49706.
56. Act on Religious Communities, SFS 1998:1593, Section 16, as amended (Swed.).
57. Id.
58. Church of Norway – A Brief History, supra note 53.
59. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway (May 17, 1814), art. 2, available at
https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/constitutionenglish.pdf.
60. Id. at art. 4.
61. Associated Press, Church-state split is sought in Norway, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 9
2006,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/650213367/Church-state-split-is-sought-inNorway.html?pg=all.
62. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, supra note 59 at art. 16.
63. PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4.
64. 2001 Religious Freedom Act (Port.).
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to the overall development of each individual and to promote the
values of “peace, freedom, solidarity, and tolerance.” 65 This idea of
separation-recognition enables religious groups to fulfil the criteria
of explicitly cooperating with the state in the promotion and
development of the core values of democracy. The state, in turn,
agrees to take into account the contributions of religions to its
objectives of common interest. 66
In Spain, the Constitution of December 27, 1978 put an end to
the denominational status of the State. 67 But, while proclaiming,
“there shall be no State religion,” 68 the Constitution adds: “The
public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society
into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate
cooperation with the Catholic Church and the other confessions.” 69
The law on religious freedom of July 5, 1980 in turn indicates in
article 17: “The State, taking account of the religious beliefs of
Spanish society, will establish, if necessary, agreements or
cooperation
conventions
with
the
registered
Churches,
denominations, and religious communities which, by their
importance and number of believers have reached a notable
rootedness in Spain.” 70 In fact, in addition to the Concordat
negotiated with the Catholic Church from 1976 to 1979, the
Spanish government signed agreements with three religious groups
having a “notable rootedness” in Spain in 1992: Jews, Muslims, and
Protestants. 71 These agreements provide these groups with some
“advantages,” including civil recognition of the marriages they
celebrate and the teaching of their religion in public schools. 72 Even
if the subject remains highly confrontational in Spain, especially on
the issue of religious education in schools, 73 this State practices its
own form of a religious recognition type of secularism.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) [hereinafter SPAIN CONSTITUTION].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. B.O.E. 1980, 177 (Spain).
71. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: SPAIN (2013).
72. Id.
73. See Mar Griera, Les débats concernant l’enseignement des religions à l’école en Espagne
[The Debates on the Teaching of Religions in School in Spain], in LE DÉFI DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT
DES FAITS RELIGIEUX À L’ÉCOLE: RÉPONSES EUROPÉENNES ET QUÉBÉCOISES [THE
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Belgium is a country where seven religious groups are
recognized by the State: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican,
Jewish, Muslim, plus a seventh non-denominational philosophical
community. 74 In contrast to the French State which neither
recognizes nor employs any religion, 75 the Belgian State not only
recognizes different religions, but also subsidizes them. 76 Rik Torfs,
of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, notes that the Belgian system
establishes a clear distinction between the State and religion and
dedicates their mutual independence. 77 He indicates that the Belgian
State applies an active neutrality regarding religions by recognizing
certain religions and financing them. 78 While opening a university
symposium in Ghent in 2010, the Flemish Minister, Geert
Bourgeois, stated that neutrality does not mean that public
authorities cannot maintain relations with religious or philosophical
organizations. It does not object to aid to churches and religious and
philosophical institutions, nor social activities subsidies of Churches
and religious or philosophical organizations. 79 Since June 21, 2002,
the Belgian State recognizes and finances the “non-denominational
philosophical communities” in addition to the six recognized
religions. 80 In Belgium, the philosophies of this group are referred to
by the term “organized secularism.” 81 As a result of this law, the

CHALLENGE OF TEACHING RELIGIOUS FACTS IN SCHOOL: EUROPEAN AND QUÉBÉCOISES
RESPONSES] 145–70 (Jean-Paul Willaime ed., 2014).
74. U.S. S TATE D EP ’ T, I NTERNATIONAL R ELIGIOUS F REEDOM R EPORT :
B ELGIUM (2013).
75. FRENCH CONSTITUTION supra note 14.
76. U.S. STATE DEP’T: BELGIUM, supra note 74.
77. Rik Torfs, Église, État et laïcité en Belgique: Remarques introductives [Church, State,
and Secularism in Belgium: Introductory remarks], in LE FINANCEMENT DES CULTES ET DE LA
LAÏCITÉ: COMPARAISON INTERNATIONALE ET PERSPECTIVES [FINANCING RELIGIONS AND
SECULARISM: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON AND PERSPECTIVES] 16–17 (Jean-François
Husson ed., 2005).
78. Id. at 17.
79. Geert Bourgeois, Toespraak bij Europees Congres “Dialoog en overleg tussen de
levensbeschouwingen/religies en de publieke overheden in Europa. Uitdagingen en grenzen
van nieuwe bestursvormen” [Speech to the European Conference “Dialogue and Reflections
between the Religions/Worldviews and the Public Authorities. Challenges and Limits of the
New Management”] (Mar. 9 2010) (transcript available at http://www.geertbourgeois.be/
toespraken/toespraak-9-maart-2010-europees-congres-%E2%80%9Cdialoog-en-overlegtussen-de-levensbeschouwingen).
80. 1994 CONST. art. 181 (Belg.).
81. Claude Javeau, La laïcité ecclésialisée: le cas de la Belgique [Ecclesiastical Secularism:
The case of Belgium], in DES MAÎTRES ET DES DIEUX: ÉCOLES ET RELIGIONS EN EUROPE
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sociologist Claude Javeau noted that secularism forms the “seventh
recognized religion” in Belgium. 82 Whether in prison or in the army,
you can as easily seek the assistance of a Catholic, Protestant, Jewish,
or Muslim chaplain as the assistance of a “humanist” chaplain (i.e.,
layman/secular). 83 The Belgian example illustrates that practicing an
active neutrality concerning religions and beliefs can be manifest in
public funding and supportive religious activities, funding that is not
incompatible with state neutrality for religious and philosophical
concepts of existence.
Germany and Austria take a different approach. In Germany,
although “there is no state church,” the most important religious
groups are recognized as corporations under public law and
integrated as partners in the public sphere. 84 Austria distinguishes
between three levels of status: 1) religious societies recognized by
law and having the status of a legal person in public law (there are
thirteen); 2) other religious communities merely “recorded by the
State”; and 3) other religious communities that are associations
governed by the Associations Act. 85
Four countries of the former Communist bloc, Latvia, Poland,
Slovakia, and Romania, chose various forms of separationrecognition when establishing their democracy. 86 So Latvia, while
proclaiming that “the church shall be separate from the State,” 87 and
stating in the Law on Religious Organizations that the State will
privilege no denomination or religion in particular, 88 recognizes
eight religious groups as “traditional churches”: Lutheran, Catholic,
Orthodox, Old Believers, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh Day
Adventists, and Jews. 89 This status, established in 2004, allows
agreements to be made with the state recognizing the specific role of
the Church in the country’s legal system and the value system of
[MASTERS AND GODS: SCHOOLS AND RELIGIONS IN EUROPE] 155 (Jean-Paul Willaime &
Séverine Mathieu eds., 2005).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 155–56.
84. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW) art.
137, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0864.
85. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT:
AUSTRIA (2013).
86. PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY supra note 4.
87. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA 1922, art. 99.
88. See Law on Religious Organizations, 1995, amended 2002, art. 2 (Lat.).
89. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: LATVIA (2013).
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society, as well as its major contribution to moral and
socialization processes. 90
The Constitution of Poland expresses a particularly strong
example of separation-recognition: “The relationship between the
State and churches and other religious organizations shall be based
on the principle of respect for their autonomy and mutual
independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle of
cooperation for the individual and the common good.” 91 This is an
explicit recognition of the contribution of religions to shared values.
According to Michaela Moravcikova, “the Slovak Republic
acknowledges [the churches’] social and legal status as public and
legal institutions sui generic, and co-operates with them according to
the principles of partnership co-operation . . . .” 92 In fact, there is a
concordat (an agreement or treaty) with the Vatican as well as
agreements with other religious communities. 93 According to
Michaela Moravcikova, the churches are “a significant part of
cultural and social life of the State, and an important factor in the
creation of a spiritual and moral consciousness in society.” 94 Hence,
the church-state relationship provides for registration of churches
and religious communities in the Ministry of Culture of the Republic
if they have at least 20,000 members. 95 However, among the twenty
or so churches and religious communities registered in 2007, some
have fewer than 20,000 members because their existence prior to the
192/1992 law on registration was taken into account. 96
In 2006, Romania adopted a law on religious freedom and the
general status of religions. 97 After asserting that “[t]he Romanian
State observes and guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of

90. Id.
91. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2ND APRIL 1997, art. 25,
para. 3.
92. Michaela Moravcikova, Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities, EUREL:
SOCIOLOGICAL
AND
LEGAL
DATA
ON
RELIGIONS
IN
EUROPE,
http://www.eurel.info/spip.php?rubrique504&lang=en (last visited June 17, 2015).
93. Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See about Catholic upbringing
and education, Holy See, Slovak Republic, May 13, 2004, no. 394/2004 Z. z (available at
http://www.concordatwatch.eu/kb-1225.834).
94. Moravcikova, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Freedom of Religion and the General Status of Denominations (Law
489/2006) (Rom.).
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thought, conscience and religion for any individual on the territory
of Romania,” 98 the law states:
(1) The Romanian State recognizes the denominations’ spiritual,
educational, social-charitable, cultural and social partnership role,
as well their status as factors of social peace.
(2) The Romanian State recognizes the important role of the
Romanian Orthodox Church and that of other churches and
denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania
and in the life of Romanian society. 99

While proclaiming that “[t]here is no State Religion in
Romania” 100 and that “the State is neutral toward any religious
persuasion or atheistic ideology,” 101 the Romanian state grants the
status of recognized denominations to the religious associations
“that, through their activities and number of worshipers, provide
guarantees of sustainability, stability and public interest.” 102 Article
18 specifies the three criteria required to qualify for the category of
“recognized religion”:
1) have been operating without interruption as a religious
organization in Romania for at least twelve years;
2) present a list proving that at least 0.1% of the population of
Romania is a member the organization;
3) present the declaration of faith and bylaws for the organization
and operation. 103

According to these standards, eighteen religious organizations
were registered as “recognized religions” by the Romanian state in
2006. 104 In addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church (and two
other Orthodox Churches), the Roman Catholic Church, the
United Romanian Church, the Greco-Roman Catholic Church, nine
Protestant churches (Reformed, two Lutheran, Baptist, Pentecostal,
two Evangelical, Seventh-Day Adventist, and Unitarian), the
Armenian Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities in
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Romania, the Muslim religion, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 105 These
churches were recognized on the understanding that the State may
decide to “withdraw the status of recognized denomination when
that denomination’s activity seriously threatens public safety, order,
health, morality or the fundamental human rights and liberties” 106
that the status of being a recognized denomination allows them.
These include the ability to:
•

cooperate “in domains of common interests” in
partnerships with public authorities; 107

•

receive, on request, state support for the
remuneration of the clerical and secular staff “based
on the number of their worshipers who are
Romanian citizens and based on their genuine needs
of subsistence and activity”; 108

•

benefit from the exemption from military service for
the clerical and monastic staff; 109

•

guarantee religious
private schools; 110

•

have, within the public education system, theological
training centres for teacher training; 111 and

•

establish, at the local level, denominational cemeteries.112

education

in

public

and

Religious organizations that do not meet the criteria to be
recognized as “religions” or who do not wish to benefit from this
status, are offered two possibilities: “religious association” or
“religious group.” 113 A religious association is defined as a legal
entity of private law composed of at least 300 people and is included
in the “Registry of religious associations.” 114 These religious
associations also benefit from tax incentives 115 and may eventually
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at art. 21.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 25.
Id. at art. 32.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. at art. 28.
Id. at art. 5 para. 2.
Id. at art. 40.
Id. at art. 44.
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become a recognized religion. 116 A religious group is a form of
association without legal personality, in other words, a de facto
association. 117
As can be seen in both Western and Eastern Europe, forms of
recognition secularism have been deployed by articulating the
reciprocal independence of the state and of religions on the one
hand, with the explicit acknowledgement of the place and role of
religions in the collective life on the other hand. Part IV further
analyses the assumptions and the impact of such a posture with
respect to the social and cultural phenomenon of religion.
IV. A SOCIAL AND CIVIC AWARENESS OF RELIGIONS
The features of religion-state relationships in European countries
reject ostracism with regard to religion. 118 These states consider that
the religious dimension of these associations is not in itself an
obstacle to their social, cultural, educational, ethical, and civic
contributions for collective life, an awareness that may even go as far
as providing funding to these organizations. 119 This attitude includes
both a trivialization of the religious phenomenon and an awareness
of its specific features. On the one hand, the attitude is trivializing in
the sense that without special attention to the religious dimension of
these organizations, they are considered to be like other social
organizations. Although based on a conviction of beliefs, these
organizations are also similar to others that perform various social
functions and whose contributions may be of interest to the state
(like sports and arts organizations for example). 120 On the other
hand, taking into account the specific features of the religious
phenomenon as a social and cultural fact, they are given specific legal
frameworks in which their organization is respected insofar as the
operation of authority and the internal implementation of their own
standards are concerned. 121
116. Id.
117. Id. at art. 1.
118. Religious Freedom in Germany, supra note 16.
119. Id.
120. In some respects, one might consider that this trivialization represents a
radicalization of secularism: getting away from any scheme of criticism of religion, religions are
approached as social and cultural facts that deploy their activities and their contributions are
positively accepted in the rules of law, human rights, and pluralist democracy.
121. See supra Part III.
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This awareness may, for example, go as far as recognizing the
right of a religious organization to dismiss one of its employees if the
employee, by his/her behaviour, contradicts the core values of the
group in which he/she freely chooses to work. In the Obst v.
Germany case concerning an official of The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (Mormon church) who was summarily dismissed
by the authorities of the church for adultery, the European Court of
Human Rights did not find that there had been an abuse of power
by the authorities of the church because of the importance of the
principle of marital fidelity to the church. 122 The employment
contract implies respect for the group’s “high moral principles.” 123
On July 9, 2013, this same Court validated the refusal of the
Romanian Orthodox Church to register a trade union of employees,
considering that not doing so would have come back to an
illegitimate interference in the internal organization of a religious
group. 124 Taking into account the specific features of religious groups
is also manifest in the fact that public authorities explicitly integrate
their contributions in the field of education, particularly with regard
to moral education, and in the field of ethics at the level of society as
a whole. 125 In doing so, states recognize religious groups as providers
of guidance and as resources in the conduct of life and the search for
a good life.
These regimes of recognition secularism ultimately reflect a
sociological understanding of religious phenomena by demonstrating
a deep understanding, though often implicit, of these religious
issues. Indeed, these devices show that public authorities have
generally understood that religious phenomena should not be
reduced either to their private and individual dimensions, or to their
dimensions of beliefs and ritual practices. The public authorities have
both implicitly and explicitly incorporated the notion that religious
associations are not like other associations into their laws and
policies. 126 They recognize that these are associations that deeply

122. Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 688, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-100463.
123. Id. at ¶ 50.
124. Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.
688, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122763#{“itemid”:[“001-122763”]}.
125. Liam Gearon, European Religious Education and European Civil Religion, 60
BRITISH J. EDUC. STUD. 151, 152 (2012).
126. Moravcikova, supra note 92.
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mobilize people, involving emotional and militant dimensions and
creating sustainable identities, in constant evolution beyond the
variety and intensity level of practices and beliefs to each other. 127
These associations constitute, for the persons who adhere to them,
identity and ethical resources; they articulate the individual and the
collective, the local and the global. 128 Above all, they provide “sense”
in the three meanings of the word: the meaning of life and death,
happiness and unhappiness; the direction of life by ethical standards
that guide behaviour; and sensations, or ways of feeling individually
and collectively, the individual and collective emotions. 129 Therefore,
it is indeed a matter of social realities sui generis, even if from one era
to another, from one culture to another; these realities are changing
and take many different forms. Religious phenomena are symbolic
infrastructure through which human beings attempt to symbolically
master their existence, to be part of space and time, in a synchrony
and a diachrony. 130 It is, therefore, a social and cultural phenomenon
that requires the implementation of a symbolic intelligence
secularism in which human beings also function within the three
above-mentioned dimensions.
Another dimension also emerged: the recognition by public
authorities of the historical and cultural importance that one or
several specific religious traditions have had in a given country. 131
The particular roles of Lutheranism in Sweden, Orthodoxy in
Romania, and Catholicism in Spain are obvious in these countries. 132
Trying to promote a sense of equality by putting all religions on the
same level—for example, Buddhism and Catholicism in Spain 133—
seems like an attempt to apply an abstract scheme that denies history
and reality. Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and
philosophical attitudes fails to account for the cultural strata of
127. See Borowski, supra note 17, at 390.
128. See id.
129. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and
Cooperation, 4 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 121, 121–22 (2012).
130. Jean-Paul Willaime, L’approche sociologique des religions. Une réduction de son objet ou
une compréhension objectivante de celui-ci? [The Sociological Approach of Religions. A
Reduction of the Issue or an Objective Understanding of It?], in L’EXPÉRIENCE RELIGIEUSE.
APPROCHES EMPIRIQUES. ENJEUX PHILOSOPHIQUES [THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES] 197–216 (Anthony Feneuil ed. 2012).
131. Act on Religious Communities, supra note 56.
132. Id.; Moravcikova, supra note 92; FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14.
133. FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14.
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societies, the fact that particular religious dimensions have played a
more significant role in the history of the societies and in their
configuration as state-national communities. This is particularly
identifiable in their national calendars 134 and the architectural
landscape of religious buildings. 135 Because of this, offering to certain
religious groups a legal framework recognizing specific rights and
some protection for facilities according to certain criteria would in
itself constitute a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). 136 This article guarantees, in addition to
the freedom of religion and belief, the protection against
discrimination of a religious or convictional group in comparison
with others—in other words, equal treatment for all of them. 137 It
should be noted that any discrimination is prohibited by the ECHR
under Article 14: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.” 138
This does not prevent the Strasbourg Court (i.e. European
Court of Human Rights) from considering the various recognition
systems practiced by the states that come within the margin of
appreciation of these states, which, given the special role of certain
religions in the collective life of their country, grant them certain
privileges. 139 The control of the Court is exercised only in ensuring
that the recognition system be open to any religious group that
meets the required criteria. 140 Thus, the Court held that Austria had
134. Ted Purinton & Vicki Gunther, Closing School for the Holidays – Whose Holidays?, 93
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 33, 33 (2011).
135. Hewitt B. Vinnedge, Popular Church Building in Medieval France, 16 CATHOLIC
HIST. REV. 44 (1930).
136. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. art. 9.
137. Id.
138. Id. at art. 14.
139. See Savez Crkava v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 85;
Religionsgemeinschaft der Zuegen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. Ct.
H.R. § 96. See also Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 96–
98; Handyside v. The United Kingdom., App. No. 5493/72, 1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 47–49;
see also Vanja-Ivan Savić, Still Fighting God in the Public Arena: Does Europe Pursue the
Separation of Religion and State Too Devoutly or Is It Saying It Does Without Really Meaning
It?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 679 (2015) (discussing the importance and application of the “margin
of appreciation” doctrine in Europe).
140. Zuegen Jehovas, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 92.
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violated Article 9 of the Convention by multiplying the obstacles. 141
This was especially evidenced by a ten-year waiting period that
prevented Jehovah’s Witnesses from being granted the status of
“religious society” (Religionsgemeinschaft), the highest degree of
recognition of a religious group in Austria, which includes the right
to teach religion in public schools. 142 In its judgement, the
Court stated:
In view of these substantive privileges accorded to religious
societies, the obligation under Article 9 of the Convention
incumbent on the State’s authorities to remain neutral in the
exercise of their powers in this domain requires therefore that if a
State sets up a framework for conferring legal personality on
religious groups to which a specific status is linked, all religious
groups which so wish must have a fair opportunity to apply for this
status and the criteria established must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. 143

In a decision concerning Croatia and the applications submitted
by several Protestant communities, the Court found that the
Croatian state’s refusal to sign agreements with the Protestant
communities constituted discrimination in exercising the right to
freedom of religion; although the conclusion of special agreements
with the state and some religious communities to establish a specific
legal regime for them, was not in itself contrary to Articles 9 and 14
of the Convention. 144 On this occasion, the Court stated:
The Court reiterates that discrimination means treating differently,
without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in
relevantly similar situations. However, the Contracting States enjoy
a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different
treatment . . . . In particular, the conclusion of agreements between
the State and a particular religious community establishing a special
regime in favour of the latter does not, in principle, contravene the

141. Id. at §§ 66–69.
142. Id. at §§ 91–92; see also Act of 20 May 1874 on the Legal Recognition of Religious
Societies, RGBl. n. 68/1874, Sec. 2 [Austria], available at http://www.legirel.cnrs.fr/
spip.php?article42; FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, RELIGIONS IN AUSTRIA 9 (Walter Reichel &
Thomas Eder eds., Maria Bennett trans., 2011) available at https://www.bka.gv.at/
DocView.axd?CobId=37670.
143. Id. at § 92.
144. Savez Crkava, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 91–93.
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requirements of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, provided that
there is an objective and reasonable justification for the difference
in treatment and that similar agreements may be entered into by
other religious communities wishing to do so. 145

The court confirmed that “the State had a duty to remain neutral
and impartial in exercising its regulatory power in the sphere of
religious freedom and in its relations with different religions,
denominations and beliefs.” 146
Beyond establishing different levels of legal recognition that
allow each religion to choose the status it prefers and allow the state
to take into account the historical and cultural significance of certain
religions in the concerned country religious organizations in many
European societies are considered useful, cultural auxiliaries that
participate in the training of people in pluralistic democracies.147
Across Europe, secularism does not necessarily mean a lack of
cooperation between public authorities and religions, as the majority
of the European countries that have implemented various religious
recognition systems incorporate a number of public interest
missions. 148 In other words, religion does not appear in Europe as an
effective foil against which the state and society should struggle for
autonomy, but as a training vector and tool for the development of
individuals that makes a useful contribution to the education of
young people in learning their future responsibilities as citizens. 149
Far from any “religious political excommunication,” 150 several
European countries are developing public policies to integrate
religion into the overall governance of the society, including in the
field of education. 151
In Europe, religions are symbolic resources that can hardly be
ignored by political leadership. In fact, in some European countries,
starting with Germany, the defense of freedoms and the protection
against the dangers of dictatorship and nationalism went hand in
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at § 85 (citations omitted).
Id. at § 88.
Moravcikova, supra note 92.
Levy & Razin, supra note 129.
Id.
See Jean-Marc Ferry, THE LIGHTS OF RELIGION: INTERVIEW WITH ÉLODIE
MAUROT [LES LUMIÈRES DE LA RELIGION: ENTRETIEN AVEC ÉLODIE MAUROT] 9–10 (2013).
Ferry asserts that the exclusion of religious beliefs out of the public sphere is impoverishing for
the citizen and democracy, a political excommunication of the religious. Id.
151. Levy & Razin, supra note 129.

801

WILLAIME.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2016 12:26 PM

2015

hand with the consolidation of the institutional position of the
churches and of their moral authority. 152 While proclaiming that
“there is no state church,” Jacques Zylberberg notes, the German
State gives part of the public space to religious institutions arising
from historical religious institutions.” 153 Thus, the government
recognizes religious institutions as political institutions participating
in the common good.
This model, which, far from reducing public action to only the
actions of the state and local authorities, recognizes that religious
groups can cooperate in public interest missions and help ensure and
legitimize democracy, particularly through their educational
endeavours that permeate both Western and Eastern Europe. 154
Ultimately, this type of secularism that dominates in Europe differs
from the French secularism. European countries have eventually
understood that the liberal state has indeed an interest in giving free
reign to religious voices in the public, political sphere and that
religious organizations are taking part in public life. As such, the
state cannot discourage believers and religious communities from
politically expressing themselves because it cannot know if in doing
so, it might restrict the secular society from accessing important
resources for the foundation of the society. 155
V. WHAT ABOUT FRANCE?
While France puts off an appearance of a completely secular state
in contrast to these other European countries, this Part will show
that developments over time have led it to a recognition secularism.
In France, the tradition of an emancipatory state exercising a
kind of philosophical authority over the population has resulted in
the belief that “true” freedom is only to be found in emancipation
from religion. 156 Thus, once a public recognition is manifest with
152. Jacques Zylberberg, Secularism Not Known: Germany, Canada, USA, UK [Laïcité,
connais pas: Allemagne, Canada, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni], 75 POWERS [POUVOIRS] 37,
39 (1995).
153. Id.
154. Levy & Razin, supra note 129.
155. Jürgen Habermas, ENTRE NATURALISME ET RELIGION: LES DÉFIS DE LA
DÉMOCRATIE [BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY],
190 (Christian Bouchindhomme & Alexandre Dupeyrix trans., 2008).
156. Jean-Paul Willaime, The Paradoxes of Laïcité in France, in THE CENTRALITY OF
RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES A. BECKFORD 41, 45–49 (Eileen
Barker ed., Allyn Hardyck trans., 2008).
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regard to the religious, this quickly gives rise to negative reactions
from those who confuse secularism and privatization of religious
matter. 157 President Jacques Chirac officially recognized the Masonic
organizations in 2003 for the 275th anniversary of the foundation of
the masonry. 158 What would people have said if he had honoured
religions in similar circumstances? Yet, the meeting between
President Nicolas Sarkozy and Pope Benedict XVI at the Elysée
Palace on September 12, 2008, was a fine example of a republican
secularism of recognition and dialogue. 159
The status of secularism in France has also evolved over the past
fifty years. Two indices are used to demonstrate the change. The first
concerns the financing of church activities. The French Republic
subsidizes the private education sector through contracts established
by the Debré Act in 1959. 160 Catholic schools were the first affected
by this “school concordat,” 161 but Jewish schools were also
affected, 162 and, since 2000, a few Muslim schools have felt the
effects as well. 163 It also applies to associations specifically dedicated
to sporting, cultural, or social matters related to different faiths. 164
The religious activities themselves, which were particularly targeted
by the prohibition of 1905, are now supported. 165 Various measures
of tax exemption have been adopted which allow religious
associations to benefit from indirect subsidies. 166 Various aids in
157. Id. at 47.
158. M. Jacques Chirac, President of France, Address on the Occasion of the 275th
Anniversary of the Masonic Order in France (June 23, 2003), available at
http://www.cesnur.org/2003/fr_chirac_1.htm.
159. Robert Marquand, With Pope’s Visit, Sarkozy Challenges French Secularism,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
layout/set/print/World/Europe/2008/0915/p01s01-woeu.html.
160. Frances C. Fowler, School Choice Policy in France: Success and Limitations, 6 EDUC.
POL’Y 429, 429–30 (1992).
161. Id.
162. Zehavit Gross, Power, Identity, and Organizational Structure as Reflected in Schools
for Minority Groups: A Case Study of Jewish Schools in Paris, Brussels, and Geneva, 50 COMP.
EDUC. REV. 603 (2006).
163. Harry Judge, The Muslim Headscarf and French Schools, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 1,
7 (2004).
164. Service Public Association [Public Service Association], Subventions versées aux
associations [Grants to Associations], SERVICE-PUBLIC.FR (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.servicepublic.fr/associations/vosdroits/F3180.
165. Id.
166. See BUREAU OF DEMOCARCY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FRANCE (2014)
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support of constructing places of worship were also added, in the
form of provision of sites, loan guarantees, and even direct support,
as in Rennes or Evry during the 1980s. 167 The Council of State was
petitioned to rule on the legality of such measures, and validated the
principle of assembly in five judgments delivered on July 19, 2011. 168
The second indication concerns acceptance of religious
affiliations as can be seen in the school environment. Though there
is a ban on wearing “patent” religious signs, 169 regulations now grant
students the ability to obtain a leave of absence for religious
obligations, and the benefit of chaplaincies, not only as provided for
by the law of December 9, 1905 in boarding schools, 170 but also in
high school and college day schools. The introduction of teaching
about religions in school curriculum since 1990-2000 also marks a
qualitative leap. 171 Built around the study of religious facts through
existing disciplines without introducing either a special subject, or
specific teaching staff, 172 the French model indeed constitutes a
unique model in Europe. The theme of “recognition” is central
however: by specifying that religious knowledge is essential to the
constitution of a “tolerant society,” the Department of Education
rediscovers, away from the abstract concept of secularism, the
importance of the religious factor in the construction of individual
and collective identities.
(“Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in profit-making activity and
receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations.”) available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=238380.
167. Cf. Portier, supra note 27, at 102.
168. CE, Commune of Trélazé [Commune de Trélazé], 19 July 2011, n. 308544 (Fr.);
CE, Federation of the free thinking and social action of the Rhône [Fédération de la libre
pensée et de l’action sociale du Rhône], M.P., 19 July 2011, n. 308817 (Fr.); CE, Urban
Community of Le Mans, Le Mans City [Communauté urbaine du Mans, Le Mans métropole],
19 July 2011, n. 309161 (Fr.); CE, Commune of Montpellier [Commune de Montpellier], 19
July 2011, n. 313518 (Fr.); CE, Mme V, 19 July 2011, n. 320796 (Fr.).
169. Code de l’éducation [Code Educ.] art. L141-5-1 (Fr.) (“In schools , colleges and
public high schools , the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious
affiliation is prohibited.”), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;
jsessionid=708182A56C05C72B347822E5F11231D7.tpdila07v_1?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000
006071191&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006524456&dateTexte=20151023&categorieLien=id#
LEGIARTI000006524456.
170. Service Public Association, supra note 164.
171. Jean-Paul Willaime, Comparer l’incomparable [Comparing the Incomparable], in LE
DÉFI DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT DES FAITS RELIGIEUX À L’ÉCOLE: RÉPONSES EUROPÉENNES ET
QUÉBÉCOISES [THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING RELIGIOUS FACTS IN SCHOOL: EUROPEAN
AND QUÉBÉCOISES RESPONSES] 7, 17 (Jean-Paul Willaime ed., 2014).
172. Id.
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Public authorities, both locally and centrally, are more and more
willing to call on religious organizations to participate in various
policy networks and in different forums for reflection where the
collective standard is being developed. The institutionalization of the
relationship between the government and the Roman Catholic
Church in 2002, 173 and the creation of the French Council of the
Muslim faith in 2003, 174 indicate, among other elements, this strong
trend of French political life. Yet, after a year marked by difficult
relations with major denominations (due to the passage of the law
opening marriage to same-sex couples), President François Hollande
himself, initially reluctant and counter to his predecessor, granted a
public dimension for the religious and justified the practice of
cooperation with holy orders during the ceremony of the vows with
religious authorities in January, 2014. 175 President Hollande stated:
I want to address you with this message, over and beyond my vows:
we can expect much from this dialogue between the State and
religions. We also feel that there is a need for spirituality in our
country. We cannot merely reduce the material considerations, even if
they are essential. Because there is a crisis, there is also the need to
have a conscience, to understand the meaning and contribute to it.” 176

Even in France then, behind the official neutrality of abstention
and non-recognition of religious groups, a certain form of
recognition-secularity is actually practiced. 177 Therefore, we can say
that in terms of state-religion relations, France is less singular and
more European than has been imagined. While maintaining
forbearance and neutrality rhetoric, ministries of the Republic
maintain regular contact with qualified representatives of different
religions, representatives who are also received at the Elysée at the
traditional New Year reception of vows. 178 The establishment, in
2002, of an annual meeting between the government and the
173. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT:
FRANCE (2005).
174. Id.
175. President Hollande Vows to Clamp Down on Religious Intolerance, FRANCE IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM (Jan 7, 2014), ambafrance-uk.org/President-Hollande-vows-to-clamp.
176. Id.
177. See Willaime, supra note 41, at 67−82.
178. France’s President Sarkozy delivers New Year address to religious representatives at the
Elysee Palace in Paris, TOWNHALL.COM (Jan. 7, 2011), http://townhall.com/photos/
2011/01/07/frances_president_sarkozy_delivers_new_year_address_to_religious_representati
ves_at_the_elysee_palace_in_paris.
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Catholic Church 179 as well as the creation in 2003 of the French
Council of the Muslim faith 180 testify, alongside other events, of a
regular practice of dialogue and consultation between public
authorities and religious authorities. 181
The consideration of religious dimensions by the Ministry of
Foreign and European Affairs’ Analysis and Prospective Center 182
shows that French diplomacy, just like American diplomacy, 183
understands that religious facts cannot be ignored in the context of
international relations. Laurent Fabius, current Minister at the
French Foreign Ministry, explained recently at a symposium that a
number of current international crises remain unintelligible and
beyond insoluble when the religious factor is not taken into account.
The analysis of developments in religious matters is an important
tool in understanding the world. Religion, because it influences
individual and collective behaviour, changes our mission of
knowledge of realities, or of knowledge of the field. The attention
we must pay it encompasses a wide variety of problems: balance
within states, bilateral relations, transnational issues, security issues,
international standards, and challenges of development. 184 He
concluded that religion can and must be a cultural factor of dialogue
and peace. In this area, France has a valuable experience to assert
without arrogance. It endeavours and will endeavour to do so. 185
All these findings contradict a secularist perception of French
secularism that ignores the religious dimensions and conveys a
unilaterally negative approach to them. It is true that discrepancies
between the speech of secularism and the practices to which they
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Eglise Catholique en France [Catholic Church in France], 10ème rencontre de
l’Instance Matignon [10th meeting of the Matignon Forum], EGLISE.CATHOLIQUE.FR (Sept.
12, 2014), http://www.eglise.catholique.fr/Actualites/382316-10eme-rencontre-linstancematignon/.
182. Corine Lesnes, Justin Vaïsse, le stratège du Quai d’Orsay [Justin Vaïsse, Foreign
Ministry Strategist], LE MONDE GIO ET POLITIQUE [THE WORLD AND POLICY] (Feb. 22,
2013),
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/02/22/le-stratege-du-quai-dorsay_1837320_3210.html.
183. Id.
184. Laurent Fabius, Religions et politique étrangère [Religion and Foreign Policy], in LA
DIPLOMATIE AU DÉFI DES RELIGIONS. TENSIONS, GUERRES, MÉDIATIONS [DIPLOMACY
CHALLENGE OF RELIGIONS, TENSIONS, WARS, MEDIATIONS] 13 (Denis Lacorne, Justin Vaïsse
& Jean-Paul Willaime eds., 2014).
185. Id. at 21.
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give rise are particularly clear in France. Throughout Europe, what is
especially notable are various forms of recognition secularism which
combine mutual independence of the state and religion with an
explicit inclusion of religion’s place and role in society. After
opposing the denominational model that prevailed in countries
having a Protestant or Orthodox culture 186 and the separation
models which prevailed in the predominantly Catholic countries of
Europe, 187 Philippe Portier describes a crossover movement where
denominational states have opened themselves to a separative logic,
separatist states to a partnership logic. Hence, we have seen, on a
European level, the emergence of a shared model of secularism while
meeting the criteria of both equality and recognition of
memberships, specific to a flexible separation scheme. 188 This is
indeed a system of separation-recognition prevailing in Europe. In
other words, a regime which, while based on the respective
autonomy of states and religions, explicitly recognizes the place and
role of religious groups by granting them a specific legal framework
within which to function.
VI. CONCLUSION
This implementation of the social recognition of religions in
many secular countries of Europe is also reflected on the same scale
in the European Union itself. The Lisbon Treaty Preamble states
that it “dr[ew] inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person,
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.” 189 In adopting
this, the European Union asserts that, among the diverse heritage
that inspire it, there are also religious heritages. The wording, by
asserting that it is from this heritage that the universal values
cherished by Europe have developed, goes further in recognizing
that religious heritages, among others, have also contributed to the
development of these values. The Preamble thus clearly differs from
the Preamble of the Charter of European Union Fundamental

186. Portier, supra note 27.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 98.
189. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Preamble, Dec. 13, 2007, 2702 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Rights, 190 which had been controversial, particularly in France,
because of the reference to the religious heritage of Europe. Not
only are religious heritages explicitly mentioned in the Lisbon treaty,
but by using the phrase “drawing inspiration from” in the treaty to
replace the word “conscious” in the Preamble to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the Lisbon Treaty recognizes that religious
heritages are also legacies that alongside others have promulgated
the democratic values upon which European states and the European
Union itself are based. This is official recognition in a secular and
non-secular pluralistic spirit, of the role of religions in the formation
of a democratic Europe.
A second element of the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the presence
of religions in the public space and explicitly agrees to take into
account their various contributions to community life without
sacrificing the independence of the state and public authorities with
regard to any religion or philosophies. The Treaty states
the following:
1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under
national law of churches and religious associations or
communities in the Member States.
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of
philosophical and non-confessional organisations [sic].

3. Recognising [sic] their identity and their specific contribution,
the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular
dialogue with these churches and organisations [sic]. 191

In other words, while clearly asserting that the state-religion
relationships are derived from national law and not from community
law, the Treaty declares that the national mechanisms built into its
twenty-eight state-members will be respected, and the European
Union explicitly recognizes the identity and specific contribution of
religious and philosophical groups (atheistic humanisms) and wishes
to maintain an “open, transparent and regular” dialogue with
them. 192 In doing so, the European Union, as are Member States,
establishes that it is not secularist, but secular.

190. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1.
191. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 49, art. 17.
192. Id.
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Beyond the diversity of Church-State relationships in the various
European countries, there is a trend towards a secular recognition of
religions. This trend combines mutual independence of the state and
religion with an explicit consideration of the role of religion within
society. The European Union and its Member states are secular and
no religion determines the politics of the States or of the E.U. As
Ronan McCrea argues: “The approaches of Member States to
religion are characterized by Europe’s common heritage of
Christianity and by humanist and secular influences that have
emerged from European history and have limited religious influence
over law and politics in Europe to a greater degree than
elsewhere.” 193 Secularism is thus an important part of the European
identity. But this fundamental secularism does not prevent taking
into account religions’ contributions to society. This idea is why I
speak of a secularism of recognition: a secularism that involves a
practice of regular dialogues between public authorities and
representatives of religion, instead of the government
ignoring religions.

193. RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
16 (2010).
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